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Abstract 
The culture of honour hypothesis offers a compelling example of how human psychology 
differentially adapts to pastoral and horticultural environments. However, there is disagreement 
over whether this pattern is best explained by a memetic, evolutionary psychological, dual 
inheritance, or niche construction model. I argue that this disagreement stems from two 
shortcomings: lack of clarity about the theoretical commitments of these models and inadequate 
comparative data for testing them. To resolve the first problem, I offer a theoretical framework 
for deriving competing predictions from each of the four models. In particular, this involves a 
novel interpretation of the difference between dual inheritance theory and cultural niche 
construction. I then illustrate a strategy for testing their predictions using data from the Human 
Relations Area File. Empirical results suggest that the aggressive psychological phenotype 
typically associated with honour culture is more common among pastoral societies than among 
horticultural societies. Theoretical considerations suggest that this pattern is best explained as a 
case of cultural niche construction. 
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Introduction 
Members of the FulBe Mare’en culture of Cameroon follow a traditional pastoral lifestyle. They 
inhabit small encampments of 3–20 families scattered across the arid plains of West Africa. 
Camp membership is highly fluid, with each family moving up to 25 times per year. FulBe 
lifestyle revolves around livestock, mainly cattle. Anthropologist Mark Moritz (2008) identifies 
some of the threats associated with this mode of subsistence: ‘Threats to cattle range in severity 
from deadly cattle raids by Musgum fishermen to extortion by heavily armed robbers, theft by 
former Tupuri herder employees, theft by FulBe herders from subsistence herds, and theft by 
FulBe herders from herds of absentee owners’ (p. 103). In his ethnographic account of the FulBe, 
Paul Eguchi offers a glimpse into how these conditions might have shaped FulBe psychology. 
Most notable is their hyper-sensitivity to insult: 
Insults involving parents and genitalia (e.g. mbasu bamma [your father’s penis] or kuttu 
yaa maa [your mother’s genitals] are the most intense and humiliating and cause, as the 
FulBe describe it, ‘soreness in the heart’…Such obscenities require an uncompromising 
defense of the parent’s honor and one’s own, often with a weapon…One-third of the 
prison population of Maroua, the provincial capital of the Far North Province of 
Cameroon, are in prison for stabbing to death someone who insulted their mother. (cited 
in Moritz 2008, p. 108) 
Such anecdotes are not uncommon among pastoralists who embrace what has come to be known 
the culture of honour (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). From an evolutionary perspective it might seem 
surprising that this disruptive and apparently maladaptive cultural pattern should emerge and 
persist at various locations across the globe. The dominant explanation holds that the reactive 
psychological phenotype is advantageous in pastoral societies because it functions as a theft 
deterrent. This psychological disposition is thought to be structured by cultural norms which are, 
in turn, selected in pastoral environments because they enhance individual biological fitness. 
This, however, is not the only version of the evolutionary story. Another possibility is that 
honour cultures sometimes involve a runaway process of cultural transmission. On this view, 
their evolution is decoupled from their effects on biological fitness. Yet another possibility is that 
honour cultures are the expression of what Shackelford (2005) calls a hardwired ‘reputation 
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maintenance mechanism’. On this view, a hyper-aggressive sensitivity to honour has a genetic 
basis that gets triggered in pastoral environments. 
       Although these evolutionary scenarios are quite different, they each claim to find support in 
the available examples of honour culture. This predicament seems to have resulted from two 
related shortcomings. First, the theoretical commitments of some models have not been 
adequately developed to identify their competing predictions. This is especially the case for dual 
inheritance and niche construction models, which are often taken to make identical predictions 
about the coevolution of genes and phenotypes. A second shortcoming is that alternative models 
have not been tested using an adequate comparative framework. As I argue below, each model 
can be associated with one or more distinct type of factor that is thought to generate phenotypic 
differences among cultures. Teasing apart these causal hypotheses requires a sufficiently variable 
dataset. Minimally, there must be variation in the ‘dosages’ of each candidate difference-maker 
in order to evaluate their respective influences (Lang et al. 2002). By contrast, alternative models 
are typically assessed against populations (e.g. Northerners vs. Southerners) in which the 
relevant factors cluster together. It is no surprise that alternative models lay claim to the culture 
of honour hypotheses—much of the available evidence is consistent with all of them. This paper 
aims to make progress on both fronts. I begin with a careful articulation of the culture of honour 
hypothesis. This is followed by a general framework for distinguishing the core theoretical 
commitments of the four dominant models of cultural evolution: memetics, evolutionary 
psychology, dual inheritance, and cultural niche construction. In particular, I defend a novel 
strategy for distinguishing the latter two models that enables one to test their rival predictions 
using comparative data. I then demonstrate how their competing predictions can be tested by 
drawing on data extracted from the Human Relations Area File. 
 
The culture of honour hypothesis consists of two components 
Before delving into these issues it is helpful to clarify some terminology. An individual’s 
psychological phenotype is his disposition to respond to certain events (e.g. an insult or threat) 
with a distinctive cognitive, emotional or behavioural response. A population of individuals can 
also share a cultural phenotype. This refers to the body of socially transmitted information (e.g. 
norms, social scripts, parenting strategies, religious convictions, technologies, etc.) that is shared 
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among members of a particular cultural group. Importantly, a psychological phenotype is a 
property of an individual whereas a cultural phenotype is a property of a population. Particular 
psychological phenotypes can also be influenced by both genetically and socially transmitted 
factors, whereas a cultural phenotype is passed on exclusively by social transmission. The 
socioecological environment is a set of conditions that determine the social and biological costs 
and benefits associated with certain patterns of behaviour. These conditions can be structured to 
some degree by the prevailing cultural phenotype. But it is usually not within an individual’s 
power to alter them. 
      With these distinctions in place it becomes clear that the culture of honour hypothesis 
consists of two distinct components (Chu et al. 2000). What I’ll call the developmental thesis 
proposes a causal link from cultural phenotype to psychological phenotype. Honour cultures are 
a distinct category of cultural phenotype. In these societies honour is closely related to social 
standing. Certain insults are recognized as a threat to one’s honour. Usually, violent aggression is 
the only acceptable response to such insult. In their description of the honour culture that prevails 
in the American South, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) provide a fairly detailed account of this 
cultural phenotype. They note that attitudes towards insult differ markedly among Southerners 
and their Northern counterparts. To take just one example, Southerners encourage their children 
to respond to bullying with violence, whereas Northerners encourage their kids to turn the other 
cheek. The developmental component of the culture of honour thesis proposes that these 
elements of the Southern cultural phenotype structure an individual’s psychological phenotype. 
Nisbett and Cohen (1996) support this claim with several lines of experimental evidence. For 
instance, they show that insulted Southern males respond with a pronounced ‘fight or flight’ 
response. These individuals also report heightened levels of subjective anger and a readiness for 
violence. Insulted Southerners further exhibit a range of aggressive non-verbal behaviours, 
suggesting a willingness to escalate confrontation. In what follows, I refer to this collection of 
responses as the ‘reactive’ psychological phenotype. By contrast, Northerners display a very 
different psychological disposition. Under identical conditions, Northerners exhibit no strong 
fight or flight response, no proneness to anger, and they will typically shrug off an insult with 
humour. Hereafter, I refer to this response pattern as the ‘passive’ psychological phenotype. 
       The second, evolutionary component of the culture of honour hypothesis proposes a causal 
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link from socioecological environment to cultural phenotype. In a prototypical pastoral 
environment an individual’s economic standing is largely bound up in livestock—a portable 
form of capital particularly vulnerable to theft. Pastoral settings are often sparsely populated and 
remote from sources of legal enforcement. Theoretical considerations suggest that these two 
conditions—vulnerability to theft and lack of legal recourse—favour the sort of reactive 
psychological phenotype characteristic of honour cultures. This idea has been explored formally 
by McElreath (2003), who shows that reputational effects can have an important influence on 
fitness under these conditions. Further theoretical support comes from Robert Frank’s (1988) 
idea of emotions as commitment devices. Consider an individual who threatens to retaliate if his 
capital is stolen. For this threat to deter, others must view it as credible. However, in a lawless 
society retaliation can be extremely costly, involving personal injury or death. It is often less 
costly for an individual to suffer occasional theft than to retaliate. But adopting this ‘rational’ 
principle of turning the other cheek only encourages further victimization. Frank proposes that 
emotions, in their capacity to override practical reason, provide a solution to this dilemma. A 
person who simply cannot restrain his own reactive tendencies is thereby committed to 
retaliation. If others recognize this reactive tendency, for instance in a person’s hyper-aggressive 
reaction to insult, he is less likely to be seriously tested on subsequent occasions. 
      Just as pastoral environments are thought to favour a psychological phenotype that is 
sensitive to honour and prone to aggression, it is likewise thought that horticultural environments 
select for the opposite psychological profile. Anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt was perhaps 
the first to observe that, among a group of related African cultures, “the pastoralists would be 
more ‘acting out’ in their interpersonal relationships, more ready to express anger and to take 
direct action, while the farmers would suppress their negative emotions and restrain their action” 
(1971, 16–17). Goldschmidt proposed that the cultural and psychological phenotypes favoured in 
pastoral societies are maladaptive in a farming context. Horticulturalists, he observed, are bound 
to a sedentary existence. They also rely on one another for defense, harvesting, and other highly 
cooperative endeavours. These conditions are thought to favour a value system that emphasizes 
passivity and tolerance—at least among fellow group members. 
      Perhaps the best available evidence for this evolutionary thesis comes from the field work of 
Robert Edgerton (1971), Goldschmidt’s graduate student. The four tribal societies investigated 
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by Edgerton were: the Hehe of Tanzania, the Kamba of Southern Kenya, the Pokot of Western 
Kenya, and the Sebei of Eastern Uganda. Each of these tribes contained both herding and 
farming communities that were fairly geographically isolated from one another. Edgerton 
exposed all eight populations to a battery of questions designed to probe their values and 
psychological dispositions. Across many of these variables, he found convergence among 
pastoralist cultures that diverged predictably from horticulturalists. Nisbett and Cohen also 
maintain that differences between Northerners and Southerners can be traced to their pre-colonial 
ancestry. Northerners are largely descended from English and German horticulturalists, while 
Southerners are descended from Scotch and Irish herders. 
       To summarize the evolutionary component of the culture of honour hypothesis, this thesis is 
best understood as a proposal about divergent selective pressures associated with pastoral and 
horticultural subsistence strategies. It proposes that distinct cultural phenotypes tend to evolve 
under these two socio-ecological environments. Taken together, the two components of the 
culture of honour hypothesis (one developmental, the other evolutionary) potentially illustrate 
how socioecological conditions shape human psychology via cultural transmission. 
 
Theoretical commitments and competing predictions of alternative models 
It is no surprise that evolutionary thinkers from a range of different theoretical backgrounds have 
seized upon this intriguing case. All four of the dominant models of cultural evolution 
(memetics, evolutionary psychology, dual inheritance, and niche construction) can arguably 
explain the pattern of cultural variation described by Nisbett and Cohen. This section focuses on 
the core theoretical commitments of all four models. The overall aim is to derive a set of distinct 
predictions from each model (summarized in Table 1) that can be tested using comparative data. 
Meme theory 
Memetic models propose that differences in psychological phenotypes are explained by 
differences in cultural phenotypes. On this view, culturally transmitted norms and practices 
influence emotions, attitudes, and behaviours. However, due to horizontal transmission, cultural 
inertia, or other factors that decouple culture from biological fitness, psychological phenotypes 
can become disassociated from the socioecological conditions that otherwise select for them. On 
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this view, honour cultures certainly evolve, but this is not explained primarily in terms of the 
fitness benefits that they afford biological individuals within pastoral environments. Rather, it is 
due to the rate at which honour-related norms are transmitted and the capacity for those norms to 
influence individual psychology. 
       Memetic models suggest some fairly straightforward predictions about patterns of cultural 
variation. Among populations that differ in their psychological phenotype (reactive vs. passive) 
there should be a predictable pattern of covariation in norms and practices. Populations that 
value honour and condone violence should exhibit relatively high rates of violent aggression in 
response to insult compared to populations that downplay honour and condemn violence. 
However, a memetic model does not predict that these phenotypes will covary with differences 
in socioecological context (pastoralism vs horticulture). Recall that these socioecological 
contexts are thought to exert divergent selection pressures on biological individuals. Memetic 
models assume that cultural phenotypes are decoupled from biological fitness. Hence, across a 
sufficiently large sample of populations that vary in pastoral versus horticultural lifestyles, 
psychological and cultural phenotypes should vary randomly with respect to this variable. 
       An important qualification to these predictions deserves mention. It is possible for cultural 
phenotypes to persist even when the socioecological conditions that once favoured them no 
longer obtain. Nisbett and Cohen appeal to this phenomenon of ‘cultural inertia’ to explain the 
persistence of honour culture in the American South despite the transition away from pastoralism 
and the adoption of centralized authority. It would seem that the important methodological lesson 
is to consider historical socioecological conditions when looking for covariation with cultrual or 
psychological phenotypes. However, there is a deeper theoretical issue. The fact that a cultural 
phenotype can persist for extended historical periods simply as an effect of its own cultrual 
inertia arguably supports a memetic model. After all, this would suggest that maintenance of the 
cultural phenotype does not require selection on biological individuals. One way to deal with this 
issue distinguishes ‘origin explanations’ from ‘maintenance explanations.’ A memetic model 
might be adequate for explaining how a certain cultural phenotype is maintained, while a more 
elaborate model might be required to explain its origin. 
       The ideal circumstances for testing the strength of cultural inertia would be to look for cases 
in which cultural phenotypes persist even when they are biologically disadvantageous. For 
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example, suppose that a pastoral population that embraces an honour culture subsequently 
converts to a horticultural lifestyle. Recall that the evolutionary component of the culture of 
honour hypotheses predicts divergent selection pressures among pastoral and horticultural 
contexts. If this is correct, the strength of cultural inertial for honour culture could be gauged 
according to the persistence of this cultural phenotype in the maladaptive horticultural 
environment. 
Evolutionary psychology (EP) 
EP models view psychological phenotypes as the expression of an underlying genetic disposition 
that has been shaped by selection on biological individuals. These models identify certain 
‘adaptive problems’ that are thought to take on slightly different manifestations in different 
cultural contexts. However, it is assumed that those problems share certain underlying structural 
features that recur over human evolutionary history. For example, Todd Shackelford proposes 
that a recurring adaptive problem in human societies is the protection of one’s resources from 
theft (for Shackelford, ‘resources’ includes mates). He further proposes that the maintenance of a 
good reputation has long been important for accessing resources, predating the relatively recent 
adoption of pastoralism. He thus proposes that humans have evolved a genetically specified 
‘reputation maintenance mechanism.’ This purported mechanism has the capacity to generate the 
reactive psychological phenotype exemplified in the American South. However, this 
developmental response is thought to be calibrated to local sociecological parameters. In 
contexts where reputational damage results in a potential loss of resources, the evolved 
mechanism responds by setting a low threshold for violent aggression. In other contexts, where 
violent outbursts potentially tarnish one’s reputation, the threshold for violent aggression is set 
much higher. Hence, this model is thought to explain the pattern of phenotypic variation that one 
observes across Northern and Southern cultures. Importantly, culturally transmitted information 
plays no role in explaining these differences. As I understand it, EP does not deny the possibility 
that some cultural variants (even particular norms and practices that pertain to honour) are 
culturally transmitted. Rather, it views these cultural variants as being insufficient to explain 
robust differences among psychological phenotypes. In other words, EP can be regarded as a 
kind of idealised model that focuses on genetically inherited psychological dispositions as the 
relevant difference makers for explaining patterns of phenotypic variation. Cultural transmission 
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is ignored not because it doesn’t exist, but rather because it is seen as causally inefficacious. 
        Before deriving comparative predictions from this model it is helpful to consider why some 
theorists regard it as a plausible default position. EP proponents often appeal to the so called 
diffusion problem to argue that cultural transmission on its own cannot produce stable 
psychological phenotypes (Atran 2001). This thesis is premised on the idea that there is a 
fundamental disanalogy between the way that genes are replicated and the process by which 
ideas are transmitted. Whereas genes involve a high fidelity process of template copying, ideas 
are thought to spread from one mind to another by ‘inferential reconstruction.’ Atran argues that 
we do not directly access the content of another person’s thoughts. Instead, our access is 
mediated by syntactically coded utterances, gestures, and actions. Atran claims that these 
‘external representations’ are typically poor reflections of the underlying ideas that generate 
them. Hence, interpreting another person’s speech or behaviour is thought to involve a 
considerable amount of inferential reconstruction. Following Dan Sperber (1996), Atran 
maintains that this reconstruction process rapidly degrades the fidelity of cultural phenotypes 
over successive transmission events. In support of this claim Atran cites experimental evidence 
where, as in the children’s game of Chinese Whispers, a phrase or story being passed along a 
chain of individuals becomes progressively distorted. If diffusion is a serious threat to cultural 
transmission, the thinking goes, then it is necessary to posit a genetic basis to explain stable 
psychological phenotypes. 
       This argument has been challenged on a number of fronts (Sterelny 2006; Henrich and Boyd 
2002; Henrich et al. 2008). A thorough critique is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as 
the following section on cultural niche construction will discuss, an EP model is not required to 
explain the stability of psychological phenotypes—even if the diffusion problem looms large. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the cultural phenotypes that influence psychological responses are 
themselves scaffolded by other cultural practices that maintain their fidelity. 
       EP models predict that psychological phenotypes will covary with the sociological 
conditions to which they are presumably adapted. Hence, the tendency to respond to insult with 
violence should recur in populations that have adopted pastoralism. Likewise, the tendency to 
refrain from violence should be found across horticultural contexts. An interesting prediction of 
EP models is that it should take relatively little time for these phenotypes to emerge once a 
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population adopts either a pastoral or a horticultural lifestyle. This prediction stems from the idea 
that individuals are genetically predisposed to generate these phenotypes. Hence the relevant 
cultural variants do not have to appear de novo and then undergo cultural transmission, as 
alternative models assume. The challenge in testing this prediction is that the relevant historical 
information can be difficult to obtain. 
       Although EP predicts a tight correlation among particular socioecological conditions and 
corresponding psychological phenotypes, it is difficult say how cultural phenotypes are expected 
to vary on this model. Part of the challenge lies in empirically distinguishing cultural from 
psychological phenotypes. EP models embrace the idea of ‘evoked’ culture (Tooby and 
Cosmides 1992). On this view, even the norms and social scripts typically thought to be socially 
transmitted are in fact an expression of some genetically inherited disposition (Gangestead et al. 
2009). This assumption makes EP models difficult to falsify using comparative data. A 
comparative approach looks for cases in which particular cultural phenotypes covary among 
populations with the psychological phenotypes that they are thought to influence. However, the 
idea of evoked culture explains this pattern in terms of a common underlying cause. Perhaps the 
strongest evidence against EP—barring identification of the relevant genes—is a pattern in 
which the predicted psychological phenotype is not uniformly expressed among cultures 
inhabiting the same socioecological context. EP must then explain why the phenotype did not 
appear despite the appropriate triggering conditions. 
Dual inheritance versus niche construction 
The two remaining models are more difficult to distinguish from one anther than was the case for 
memetics and EP. As discussed below, both models posit an interaction between genetically and 
epigenetically inherited factors in the production of psychological phenotypes. The challenge is 
to identify a particular type of epigenetic factor that is identified by one model and not the other. 
After briefly outlining dual inheritance theory (DIT), I will defend a novel strategy for 
distinguishing it empirically from cultural niche construction (NCT). 
       DIT has been aptly described by Laland and Brown as, ‘a hybrid cross between memetics 
and evolutionary psychology, with a little mathematical rigor thrown into the pot’ (2002, p. 242). 
Like memetics, DIT views culture as a system of ideational phenomena (beliefs, skills, norms, 
and so on) that can be socially transmitted among unrelated individuals. Like EP, DIT posits 
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genetically inherited psychological dispositions that interact with socially transmitted 
information. Together, these two factors influence phenotypic evolution, potentially giving rise 
to variation among cultures in both psychological and cultural phenotypes. 
       A canonical example of DIT in humans involves the evolution of lactose tolerance. The 
genetically inherited capacity to digest fresh milk in adulthood exhibits a complex pattern of 
association with specific cultural practices surrounding dairy consumption (Holden and Mace 
1997). Lactose tolerance is prominent in northern Europe and some African cultures with long 
traditions of consuming fresh milk. This phenotype is less common in Mediterranean cultures 
where milk products are processed into yogurt and cheese, thus reducing lactose content. Within 
East Asian and sub Saharan cultures, where all forms of dairy consumption are rare, this 
phenotype is least prevalent. This pattern suggests that the genetic disposition for lactose 
tolerance coevolves with particular cultural practices surrounding lactose consumption. 
However, lactose consumption has been practiced for millennia in many North African and 
Middle Eastern cultures, where rates of lactose tolerance remain low (ibid). Such observations 
have suggested two alternative hypotheses. One proposal is that lactose tolerance is beneficial in 
low sunlight environments because it facilitates the absorption of vitamin D (Flatz and 
Rotthauwe 1973). A second proposal is that lactose tolerance is beneficial in arid environments 
where rates of milk consumption are particularly high in order to avoid dehydration (Cook and 
Al-Torki 1975). These two alternative hypotheses propose additional causal factors, in 
conjunction with dairy farming, as the explanation for the observed pattern of cultural variation 
in lactose tolerance. In a classic study, Holden and Mace (1997) tested these hypotheses using a 
phylogenetic comparison of 62 cultures in which levels of lactose tolerance varied. Importantly, 
their sample contained cultures in which the three candidate causal factors—lactose 
consumption, sunlight, and aridity—independently varied. The fact that lactose consumption was 
the only factor that covaried with high rates of lactose tolerance enabled them to rule out sunlight 
and aridity as likely causes. This study provides an excellent illustration of how DI models can 
be tested using comparative data. The characteristic feature of these models is that they identify 
two interacting causal factors—one cultural, the other genetic—to explain a particular pattern of 
phenotypic variation. 
       Niche construction models are perhaps the most challenging to interpret from within a 
comparative framework. One potential strategy is to draw on prototypical examples of niche 
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construction in non-human animals for guidance. Beaver dams and termite mounds are canonical 
examples. In these cases, some modification to the physical environment is maintained by a 
population of organisms. These structures persist over multiple generations, thereby qualifying 
as a channel of epigenetic inheritance. Most importantly, these modified environments can 
influence phenotypic evolution in the populations that maintain them. Laland and Sterelny 
(2006) identify three distinct ways that phenotypes and niches might interact. One possibility 
involves ecological buffering. Some organisms (e.g. earthworms) create a suitable micro-niche 
that buffers certain traits against broader environmental changes. A second possibility involves 
coevolution among phenotypes and niches. Here, various elements of the niche impose a 
selection pressure on certain phenotypes, resulting in genetic adaptation. The third possibility 
involves the regulation of gene expression. In this case, features of the niche influence the 
reaction norm of a trait. This can result in the stable production of certain phenotypes that are 
environmentally canalized by the elements of the niche. These three processes can interact, 
resulting in organisms that are highly functionally integrated with their constructed niches. 
       Turning to the case human culture, one finds a number of similarities to prototypical 
examples of niche construction. Cultural traditions are systems of epigenetic inheritance that can 
influence phenotypic evolution in all three of the ways that Laland and Sterelny outline. For 
example, the fabrication of clothing and shelter buffers humans against features of the broader 
environment, enabling some populations to inhabit extreme climates without requiring dramatic 
phenotypic changes. Phenotypes and cultural traditions also coevolve, as is exemplified by the 
evolution lactose tolerance. Features of a cultural tradition can also influence the development of 
certain phenotypes. Indeed, this is precisely what is proposed by the developmental component 
of the culture of honour hypothesis, where certain honour-conducive norms are thought to 
produce the reactive psychological phenotype exhibited in the American South. But these 
similarities do not point to a clear distinction between dual inheritance and cultural niche 
construction. In both models, one finds culturally transmitted factors interacting with genetically 
inherited factors to produce phenotypic differences. How, if at all, can these two models be 
distinguished in the case of human culture? 
       Sterelny (2003, 2006) offers an interesting solution to this problem. On his account, niche 
construction is equated with the practice of cultural scaffolding. Cultural scaffolding involves an 
interaction between two types of cultural factor. The first (scaffolding) factor facilitates the 
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acquisition and retention of some second (scaffolded) factor. Sterenly’s example of a scaffolding 
factor is the explicit teaching of certain lithic technologies. He argues that the capacity to build 
complex stone tools could not be acquired by simple imitation learning. Instead, teachers must 
emphasize and repeat certain steps in the construction process for transmission to succeed. By 
contrast, some cultural artefacts appear not to require scaffolding for their reliable transmission. 
For instance, the practice of termite fishing in chimpanzees seems to persist across transmission 
events by imitation learning alone. On Sterelny’s account, the evolution of termite fishing can 
potentially be explained by a dual inheritance model; but the evolution of complex human tools 
is a case of niche construction. This proposal for distinguishing DIT from NCT has at least one 
significant benefit: the two types of model potentially generate distinct evolutionary predictions. 
This is true if simpler forms of imitation are vulnerable to the diffusion problem. Recall that the 
diffusion problem involves a loss of fidelity in some cultural variant over successive 
transmission events. Insofar as cultural scaffolding buffers against information loss, one would 
predict that complex traditions cannot evolve by dual inheritance alone. On Sterelny’s account, 
complex cultural traditions evolve exclusively by a process of cultural niche construction, 
whereas dual inheritance generates less complex outcomes. 
       This version of the distinction is tailored to explaining the origin of complex culture in 
humans. However, it is less clear whether this distinction is suitable for explaining patterns of 
variation in complex cultural phenotypes. This point can be framed as a dilemma for anyone who 
equates cultural niche construction with scaffolding. Suppose, on the one hand, that scaffolding 
is not necessary for the evolution of complex culture. Some theoretical work suggests, for 
example, that complex cultural traits can evolve in populations that rely only on simple learning 
rules alone (Henrich et al. 2008). This is just to say that the diffusion problem might be less 
significant than some theorists have assumed. In that case, dual inheritance and niche 
construction models no longer make distinct evolutionary predictions. Cultural Scaffolding 
might facilitate the transmission of some cultural phenotypes and not others, but there would be 
no principled difference in complexity among the outcomes of these two processes. In which 
case, the utility of this distinction is seriously compromised. On the other hand, suppose that 
diffusion is in fact a significant threat to the fidelity of cultural transmission. In this case, all 
examples of complex cultural evolution would qualify as instances of niche construction because 
they are scaffolded. If that were true, then the operative distinction loses explanatory value for a 
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different reason. Most of the salient differences among contemporary cultures (e.g. religion, 
subsistence strategies, normative frameworks, systems of government, technology, etc.) involve 
complex—i.e. scaffolded—cultural phenotypes. The implication is that dual inheritance theory 
explains few if any of the differences among contemporary human cultures. Hence, either the 
diffusion problem is overstated, and scaffolding is not a sufficiently robust causal process to 
differentiate DIT from NCT; or, diffusion is a serious problem, and DIT does not apply to most 
of the salient differences among cultures. 
       These implications would be acceptable were there no alternative way to distinguish these 
models. However, NCT is a new theory that has been largely motivated by canonical examples 
from the animal literature. The precise application of this theory to human culture is an ongoing 
topic for debate. In the remainder of this section I will propose an alternative way to distinguish 
DIT from NCT. The aim is to identify each model with a type of causal factor that is relevant to 
explaining cultural differences among contemporary human populations. 
       As a point of departure, it is helpful to reflect on the sorts of factor that are likely to 
influence patterns of phenotypic variation among cultures. One plausible candidate is the degree 
of functional integration among the components of a cultural tradition. Some traditions are 
highly integrated in the sense that their components work together in the production of a 
psychological phenotype. The literature on social construction of emotion offers a wealth of 
examples. For instance, Griffiths and Scarantino (2005) observe that over the course of military 
training a variety of different ‘emotional technologies’ ensure that soldiers will despise their 
enemy, exhibit loyalty to their unit, and not succumb to fear in the face of battle. Importantly, 
this psychological phenotype is reinforced by a broad range of rituals and norms that are 
embedded in the process of military training. Religions also exhibit a high degree of functional 
integration. For example, the vaulted ceilings of cathedrals are thought to conspire with the vivid 
imagery expressed in religious sermons to generate experiences of awe and reverence. We can 
think of these cohesive traditions (for lack of a better term) as the cultural analogues of genes 
that have redundant phenotypic effects. The removal of one gene does not prevent the associated 
phenotype from developing. Likewise, the removal of one routine from a regiment of military 
training is unlikely to make soldiers less obedient. Importantly, not all cultural variants form 
cohesive traditions. Some variants are transmitted as fairly autonomous units. An example might 
be particular lithic technologies. Sterelny argues that the cultural transmission of complex stone 
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tools requires a scaffolding mechanism such as guided learning. It is conceivable that these two 
components are transmitted as a fairly autonomous unit. One could acquire this skill package 
without having to embrace an interconnected system of norms and behaviours. 
       Differences in the degree of functional cohesion among cultural phenotypes should impact 
the rates at which phenotypes evolve. Functional cohesion is a buffering force against change in 
psychological phenotypes. One would thus predict that psychological phenotypes evolve more 
slowly when they are buffered by cohesive traditions than when they are scaffolded by relatively 
autonomous units. A second prediction concerns their influences on psychological phenotypes. 
Cohesive traditions consist of multiple reinforcing elements that work together in the production 
of a particular phenotype. By contrast, autonomous cultural units are more singular in their 
psychological effects. The removal of an autonomous element can result in the loss of the 
associated psychological phenotype. By contrast, the removal of a single element from a 
cohesive tradition is less likely impact the associated phenotype, because complementary 
elements contribute to the same phenotypic outcome. 
       This distinction between cohesive traditions and autonomous cultural units provides an 
alternative framework for distinguishing NCT from DIT. In canonical examples of niche 
construction in animals, the epigenetically inherited structure is often highly functionally 
integrated. This property is perhaps most pronounced in the termite mounds studied by Scott 
Turner and colleagues (2000). Turner describes how various structural features of the termite 
nest regulate the moisture content within the colony. In such examples there is no single 
epigenetically transmitted factor that interacts with a particular phenotypic variable. Rather, there 
is an integrated system of ecological factors that influence the evolution and development of 
various aspects of the termite phenotype. Contrast this highly integrated system with the more 
singular causal relationship described in the evolution of lactose tolerance. In the latter example, 
a single cultural factor (amount of lactose consumption) coevolves with a particular phenotypic 
variable (degree of lactose tolerance). Here the epigenetic factor is capable of undergoing 
independent variation. As noted earlier, some cultures reduce lactose content in their diet by 
processing dairy products into cheese and yogurt. This small change in practice results in 
intermediate levels of lactose tolerance. Hence, in this canonical example of dual inheritance it is 
possible to isolate the relevant cultural factor from other features of the cultural phenotype and 
identify its particular phenotypic effect. 
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       The final piece of the puzzle is to show how NCT and DIT generate distinct predictions that 
can be tested using comparative data. The most salient difference between these models is the 
number of distinct cultural factors that scaffold a particular psychological phenotype. NCT 
predicts that the reactive psychological phenotype will covary across cultures with a large 
number of norms and practices that promote aggression and emphasize honour. Likewise, NCT 
predicts that the passive psychological phenotype will covary with a large number of norms and 
practices that downplay honour and shun violence. By contrast, DIT predicts that each of these 
phenotypes will covary with a particular norm or practice. An important challenge in testing 
these predictions is how to individuate the relevant cultural elements. Nisbett and Cohen provide 
an illustration of how one might approach this issue. They surveyed both Northerners and 
Southerners about their attitudes towards (1) the appropriate response to insult, (2) the 
appropriate response to a physical affront, (3) the appropriate way to socialize children. One 
could potentially expand on this methodology by including additional questions to their survey.
1
 
The more that these individual cultural factors conspire in the buffering of a psychological 
phenotype, the closer a system comes to satisfying the assumptions of a NCT model. 
       Nisbett and Cohen’s survey is also instructive for a very different reason. Although they 
found that Northerners differed predictably from Southerners across all three cultural factors, this 
cannot be taken to support NCT. The problem is that only two populations were compared. It is 
impossible to determine from such a sparse dataset whether the three factors form a cohesive 
tradition. For example, it is impossible rule out the possibility that a single factor (e.g. 
differences in childhood socialization) is responsible for generating the observed phenotypic 
differences. In order to discriminate among these hypotheses a much more comprehensive 
sample is required. In particular, one must compare multiple populations in which there is 
variation in the particular elements that form a cultural phenotype. One can then begin to isolate 
those factors and determine whether their phenotypic effects are cohesive or singular. With this 
proposal on the table it is now possible to distinguish the competing predictions of all four 
models of cultural evolution (summarized inTable 1). Nisbett and Cohen’s findings fail to 
discriminate among alternative models. However, in the following section I discuss a pilot study 
that aims to demonstrate how these models could potentially be tested by undertaking a more 
comprehensive cultural comparison. 
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Table 1 
Summary of core theoretical commitments for each of the four dominant models of cultural 
evolution. Each model is associated with a set of comparative predictions describing the patterns 
of covariation that are predicted in a sample of populations that vary in (1) socioecological 
context, (2) cultural phenotypes, and (3) composition of psychological phenotypes 
 
Model Core theoretical commitment Comparative predictions 
Memetic 
Cultural phenotypes generate 
psychological phenotypes independent of 
effects on biological fitness. 
Particular psychological phenotypes   
     should covary with particular cultural  
     phenotypes among populations. 
Particular psychological phenotypes  
    should vary randomly across  
    socioecological contexts in which  
    they are more or less biologically  
    advantageous. 
Psychological phenotypes should persist  
    in maladaptive socioecological contexts. 
Evolutionary 
psychology 
Recurring socioecological conditions 
trigger the development of adaptive 
psychological phenotypes. 
Transition to alternate socioecological  
    contexts should be followed by rapid  
    change in psychological phenotype. 
Particular psychological phenotypes  
    should covary with recurring  
    socioecological contexts in which  
    they are adaptiveadaptive. 
Particular psychological phenotypes  
    should vary randomly with respect to  
    particular cultural phenotypes. 
Dual 
inheritance 
Autonomous cultural units interact 
with particular genetic dispositions to 
generate psychological phenotypes, 
adapting biological individuals to 
socioecological contexts. 
Small number of cultural factors should  
    covary with particular psychological  
    phenotypes. 
Small number of cultural factors should  
    covary with particular socioecological          
    contexts. 
Cultural niche 
construction 
Cohesive cultural traditions interact 
with genetic dispositions to generate 
psychological phenotypes, adapting 
biological individuals to 
socioecological contexts. 
Large number of cultural factors should  
    covary with particular psychological  
    phenotypes. 
Large number of cultural factors should  
    covary with particularsocioecological    
    contexts. 
Small amounts of variation in the    
content  of cultural phenotypes should  
not covary with differences in 
psychological phenotypes. 
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Testing competing predictions using the Human Relations Area File 
The aim of the discussion so far has been to develop a theoretical framework that allows rival 
models of cultural evolution to be tested using comparative data. Demonstrating the practical 
utility of this framework requires showing how it can be applied to an actual cross cultural 
sample. As it was argued earlier, Nisbett and Cohen’s comparison among just two cultures 
cannot differentiate among competing predictions of rival models. In order to tease apart the 
relevant causal factors, a sample of cultures should ideally exhibit the following four features. 
1.  Variation in socioecological context (pastoral vs. horticultural). 
2. Variation in psychological phenotype (reactive vs. passive). 
3. Variation in content of cultural phenotype (emphasising honour and condoning violence vs.    
    downplaying honour and condemning violence). 
4. Variation in number of integrated components among cultural phenotypes (cohesive traditions  
     vs. autonomous elements). 
       In an effort to compile an adequate data set, a sample of ethnographic excerpts was 
downloaded from the electronic version of the Human Relations Area File World Cultures 
(HRAF). This massive database contains over 600,000 pages of materials collected by 
professional anthropologists from 258 indigenous cultures. The most unique feature of the 
HRAF is a coding system called the Outline of Cultural Materials (OCM), which identifies some 
630 subject areas. These codes have been painstakingly assigned by professional anthropologists, 
on a paragraph by paragraph basis, to all of the ethnographic materials contained in the HRAF. 
This is a valuable and underutilized resource for testing hypotheses in cultural evolution. In order 
to zero-in on excerpts most relevant to the culture of honour hypothesis, I restricted my sample 
to only cultures that had been HRAF-classified as Pastoralist, Horticulturalist, or Intensive 
Agriculturalist.
2
 Just 18 OCM categories were deemed relevant to the culture of honour 
hypothesis (Table 3). This resulted in a more manageable database of 8441 excerpts drawn from 
161 sources describing 18 distinct cultures (Table 2). The excerpts were downloaded into a 
database using Microsoft Access to allow for easy comparison (hereafter the COH Database). 
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Table 2 
Description of excerpts in COH Database 
Subsistence type Culture Location # Bibliographic sources Excerpts 
Pastoralists 
Chukchee Siberia 6 164 
Kurds Kurdistan 9 121 
Bedouin Libya 12 1118 
Maasai Kenya/Tanzania 13 293 
Saami Scandinavia 13 766 
Horticulturalists 
Alorese East Indonesia 4 383 
Azande Central Africa 17 389 
Garifuna West Africa 13 402 
Garo India 11 215 
Kogi Colombia 2 206 
Kuna Panama 16 714 
Mentawaians Sumatra 4 131 
Rungus Dusun Borneo 2 206 
Intensive agriculturalists 
Amhara Ethiopia 8 624 
Badaga Nilgiri, India 2 154 
Dogon Mali 10 1103 
Ifugao Philippines 7 656 
Kapauku New Guinea 2 456 
Lepcha Bhutan 6 164 
South Toraja Sulawesi 4 176 
Total 18   161 8441 
 
Methods and operational assumptions 
The first step was to identify particular OCM categories to serve as proxy variables for the 
relevant psychological and cultural phenotypes. Of the 18 OCM categories singled out for this 
study, two were taken to reflect differences in psychological phenotype. The HRAF Guidelines 
describe the category of Ingroup Antagonisms (OCM 578) as involving, ‘intentional 
impoliteness, ridicule, insults, vituperation; the prevalence, causes and forms of quarrels,’ as well 
as ‘Manifestations (e.g.) verbal exchanges, fist fights, duels.’ (eHRAF World Cultures). Based 
on this description, it was assumed that differences in the number of excerpts reporting Ingroup 
Antagonisms among cultures reflects the extent to which they exhibit a reactive or passive 
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psychological phenotype. Along similar lines, Offenses Against the Person (OCM 683) include, 
‘Definitions, incidence of, and sanctions for acts of physical and verbal aggression (e.g., assault, 
battery, mayhem, slander, libel); penalties for sorcery; etc.’ (eHRAF World Cultures). This 
category of excerpt can also be taken to reflect a reactive as opposed to a passive psychological 
phenotype. It was therefore predicted that the frequency of excerpts in these two categories 
would be greater for Pastoralists than for the other two subsistence categories. This prediction 
was tested by regressing the proportions of excerpts contained in each OCM category across the 
three subsistence types. Importantly, some cultures were represented in the COH database by a 
much larger number of excerpts than others. To correct for this bias, the analysis was based on 
the relative proportions of excerpts contained in each OCM category for each culture. For 
example, a high proportion of Ingroup Antagonisms implies that a sizable number of all excerpts 
describing that culture fall into this category. 
       Identifying useful proxies for differences in the content of cultural phenotypes proved more 
challenging. Of the 16 remaining OCM categories, most do not single out a particular attitude 
towards violent aggression. For example, Transmission of Cultural Norms (OCM 867) and 
Ethics (OCM 577) are just as likely to contain excerpts that endorse aggression as they are to 
contain excepts that condemn it. One important exception is the category of Social Control 
(OCM 626). This category includes excerpts that mention: 
       Incentives to conformity (e.g., expectation of rewards, reciprocity, fear of social and 
supernatural sanctions, conscience); means of inducing conformity (e.g., example, precept, 
praise, rewards, warnings, threats); pressure of public opinion; informal mechanisms of social 
control (e.g., criticism, ridicule, gossip, cursing, sorcery, intentional silence, ostracism); 
incidence and effectiveness of such sanctions as compared with the application of physical force; 
etc. (eHRAF World Cultures). Based on this description, it was assumed that the proportion of 
excerpts reporting instances of Social Control reflect the extent to which a population condemns 
violence as a strategy for resolving disputes. It was therefore predicted that Pastoralists cultures 
would contain lower frequencies of excerpts mentioning Social Control than Horticulturalists 
cultures. This prediction was tested using the same procedure that was described above. 
       The most difficult factor to operationally define is the degree of functional integration 
among components of a cultural tradition. Earlier, it was proposed in the context of Nisbett and 
Cohen’s work that attitudes toward childhood socialisation are a distinct type of cultural factor 
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from attitudes towards violence in adults. Arguably, these two factors influence psychological 
phenotypes in different respects. Childhood socialization is thought to structure an individual’s 
psychological phenotype, for example, to become prone to violence or sensitive to insult. Norms 
encountered in adulthood can either reinforce this training or mitigate its influence. The potential 
for these two types of cultural factor to vary in content suggests a very basic proxy for 
comparing the cohesiveness of cultural traditions among cultures. If attitudes towards childhood 
socialization are consistent with attitudes towards adult violence, this is evidence for a relatively 
cohesive tradition. By contrast, if just one of these elements is present it can be regarded as a 
relatively autonomous unit. The most conspicuous OCM category for addressing this issue is 
Aggression Training (OCM 865), defined as including, ‘Adult beliefs, standards, and aims 
concerning aggression in children and means of controlling it; incidence and treatment of 
physical aggression (e.g., striking, biting, kicking, hair-pulling); incidence and treatment of 
verbal aggression…’ (eHRAF World Cultures). Notice that this category does not discriminate 
with respect to content. Hence, in order to analyze this OCM category I reviewed all 199 
excerpts labeled as Aggression Training. For each excerpt that mentioned a parental attitude 
toward aggression in children, it was recorded whether that attitude was (a) tolerant or promoting 
of aggression, (b) opposed to aggression, or (c) neutral. It was predicted that attitudes would be 
tolerant or promoting in Pastoral populations, opposing in Horticultural populations, and neutral 
in Intensive Agricultural societies. In addition, this variable provided a rough basis for 
discriminating DIT from NCT. Specifically, NCT predicts that attitudes tolerant or promoting of 
childhood aggression should cluster with low levels of Social Control in populations where 
Ingroup Antagonisms and Offenses Against the Person are relatively high. At the same time, 
NCT predicts that attitudes opposing childhood aggression should covary with high levels of 
Social Control and low levels of the two psychological proxies for psychological aggression. By 
contrast, DIT predicts no clustering in the two cultural factors. If just one type of cultural factor 
reliably covaries with proxies for the psychological phenotype, this is evidence for a relatively 
autonomous unit of influence. 
       It should be emphasized that this pilot study does not provide a comprehensive test of the 
four rival models. Rather, it should be regarded primarily as an illustration of how the 
predictions outlined in the previous section can be operationalised and tested. A more thorough 
study would identify several quantitative variables for gauging the content of psychological 
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phenotypes. Ideally, these variables would be capable of independent variation, so that one could 
assess the extent to which particular norms and attitudes cluster into cohesive traditions. The 
OCM classification system is a fairly blunt instrument in this respect. However, its value lies in 
the compilation of ethnographic reports collected independently at various time periods. The fact 
that excerpts were blindly coded also helps to correct against investigator bias. 
       Perhaps the most significant limitation of this pilot study is that phylogenetic relationships 
among cultures were unknown. There is some consolation in the fact that the 18 cultures 
investigated in this study came from different language groups which, in many cases, are 
disparately located across the globe (see Table 2). However, it remains possible that some 
cultural similarities were due to shared ancestry rather than to sociecological context. Results 
should be interpreted with this possibility in mind. 
 
Results of pilot study 
Perhaps the most important finding was that the proportion of excerpts coded as Ingroup 
Antagonisms were significantly higher among Pastoralists than among non-pastoralists 
(Kruskal–Wallis X2 = 5.9796, df = 2, p = 0.05). This is impressive considering that only five 
Pastoral cultures were represented in the sample, thus reflecting a difference of considerable 
magnitude. It is also noteworthy that the majority of OCM categories (15 of the 18 examined) 
showed no significant association with a particular subsistence type. Hence, this association 
stood out as one of the few salient patterns in the sample (Table 3). Although the proportion of 
excerpts mentioning Offenses Against the Person was, on average, higher among Pastoralists 
than the other subsistence categories, this difference was not significant (p = 0.778). This lack of 
significance could be due to the relatively small number of excerpts in this OCM category 
overall. 
     A second OCM category that varied with subsistence type was Social Control (Kruskal–
Wallis X
2
 = 5.7236, df = 2, p = 0.057). Here again the difference was in the predicted direction, 
with Horticulturalists exhibiting a higher proportion of Social Control excerpts than the other 
two categories. Earlier, it was suggested that the definition of this category is suggestive of 
norms that condemn violence. Hence, it was taken to serve as a proxy for extent to which 
cultural phenotypes vary along this dimension. To verify this assumption, I inspected 90 
randomly selected excerpts from the Social Control category of the COH Database.  
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Table 3 
Percentages of excerpts falling under each OCM category averaged across cultures within the 
same subsistence type. 
OCM title OCM # 
Subsistence type 
Pastoral Horticulture Intense Ag. 
Drives and emotions 152 7.4 6.87 15.08 
Personality development 155 1.61 5.99 6.94 
Social personality 156 8.59 1.94 5.29 
Personality traits 157 4.37 11.03 8.13 
Gestures and signs 201 2.64 3.21 2.83 
Public opinion 208 0.79 1.12 1.2 
Ethics 577 7.63 10.38 9.98 
Ingroup antagonisms 578 34.51* 19.18 23.0 
Social control 626 3.23 9.05* 3.39 
Inter-community relations 628 13.3 10.53 10.59 
Offenses against persons 683 4.04 5.49 3.63 
Property offenses 685 5.66 7.98 16.16 
Social offenses 689 0.82 1.7 1.54 
Techniques of socialization 861 3.71 3.77 2.62 
Aggression training 865 0.91 5.31 1.28 
Independence training 866 0.83 1.28 0.91 
Transmission of norms 867 1.08* 3.75 2.47 
Transmission of beliefs 869 0.55 1.35 3.66 
Significant differences are indicated with an asterisk “*” 
 
Even in this small sample one finds a distinct pattern. Explicit sanctions against outward 
aggression are common among Horticulturalists but rare in Pastoral societies. The following 
examples, drawn from Horticulturalist cultures, offer an instructive glimpse into the cultural 
phenotype typical of this subsistence category: 
 
Azande (Central Africa): Belief in witchcraft is a valuable corrective to uncharitable 
impulses, because a show of spleen or meanness or hostility may bring serious 
consequences in its train. Since Azande do not know who are and who are not witches, 
they assume that all their neighbours may be witches, and are therefore careful not to 
offend any of them without good cause. (Seligman 1929, p. 117) 
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Garo (India): An individual who habitually fails to co-operate with other villagers 
becomes an object of derision and his behaviour is openly criticized; but nobody has the 
authority to inflict punishment for non-compliance. The whole village organization works 
on the principle of reciprocity. If a villager does not co-operate in the construction of the 
house of a fellow villager, he cannot expect that other villagers would co-operate with 
him when his own house is being built. (Goswami and Majumdar 19658, p. 67) 
 
Kuna (Panama): It is important to note that physical violence is avoided among the 
Kuna; there are very strong sanctions against it. Parents do not spank their children. 
Physical fighting is very rare and always becomes the subject of an evening discussion in 
the ‘gathering house,’ in which the protagonists are severely reprimanded and fined. 
(Sherzer 1983, p. 201) 
 
Garifuna (West Africa): Since open aggression is not sanctioned in the social group at 
large, the weapon of ridicule in the form of derisive songs, nicknames, and malicious 
gossip, is often resorted to. (Galvão and Coelho 1955, p. 68) 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, there was a significant interaction among subsistence type and the OCM 
category labeled Transmission of Social Norms OCM category. Pastoralists contained a higher 
proportion of these excerpts than the other two subsistence types. However, this again might be 
an artefact due to the small number of excerpts in this category. 
     My final analysis involved a review of the excerpts falling under Aggression Training. It 
should be noted that only a small subset of excerpts (just 95 of the 199) clearly expressed 
parental attitudes towards aggression. Unfortunately, these excerpts did not contain a sufficient 
number of cultures from each subsistence category to allow for statistical comparison.. On the 
whole, evidence of pro-aggression parenting norms was found in three out of the five Pastoral 
societies. By contrast, no pro-aggression norms were identified in Horticultural societies. Pro-
aggression norms were only mentioned in two other cultures, both of them Intensive 
Agriculturalists. Although there were only three Horticultural populations represented in this 
subsample, they collectively accounted for over 50 % of all excerpts mentioning anti-aggression 
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parenting norms. These findings, though inconclusive, are consistent with the predicted pattern 
of variation among parental attitudes and subsistence categories. 
       There was only one culture that diverged from this pattern. The Saami (a Pastoral culture) 
contained several excerpts mentioning anti-aggression parenting norms. For example, according 
to Pelto’s ethnography of the Saami, ‘fairly strict measures, including spanking, are used to teach 
children that they should not fight’ (1962, p. 384). This is in contrast to relatively high rates of 
Ingroup Antagonism in this population. It should be noted that these reports come from a single 
source. However, this is not the only example of a pastoral culture exhibiting high rates of 
violence despite reports of norms that condemn aggression (Moritz, 2008). Such observations 
have led some anthropologists to suggest that aggressive psychological phenotypes can be 
generated simply by engaging in the practice of animal husbandry. As Lott and Hart (1977) 
hypothesize, “If a herdsman has the personality needed to display sufficient aggression to 
maintain his position as dominant over all cattle in his herd, we might expect that his interactions 
with people would also involve assertive and aggressive behaviour” (1977, p. 177). This 
hypothesis identifies an additional factor, independent of aggression norms and parenting styles, 
that potentially reinforces a reactive psychological phenotype in pastoralists. If correct, this 
hypothesis suggests that reactive psychological phenotypes are scaffolded by a variety of 
different components of a pastoral lifestyle. 
      This suggestion brings us to the final question of whether the cultural phenotypes associated 
with Pastoral or Horticultural populations tend to form cohesive traditions. It was predicted that 
covariation among parental attitudes and Social Control would be the kind of pattern one might 
expect according to NCT. Unfortunately, there were too few excerpts in the Aggression Training 
category to test for a statistical association. However, the available evidence points towards 
cohesive traditions. For example, excerpts for the Chuckchee and the Maasai (both Pastoralists) 
describe the encouragement of aggression in children. Young men in both cultures were reported 
to undertake forms of ‘battle training’ involving mock property raids that occasionally become 
violent. This is a remarkable point of convergence among such distantly related Pastoral cultures. 
At the same time, both the Chuckchee and the Maasai exhibit some of the lowest proportions of 
excerpts mentioning Social Control (just 1.8 and 4.78 % respectively). By comparison, 
proportions of Social Control excerpts were characteristically high among Horticulturalists 
(Azande = 12.1 %, Garo = 7 %, Kuna = 17.8 %, Garifuna = 19.65 %). This pattern suggests that 
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norms condemning violence are least frequent in cultures where pro-aggression parental 
practices are most likely to be found. 
 
Conclusion: an argument for niche construction 
Results of the pilot study suggest that the reactive psychological phenotype documented by 
Nisbett and Cohen in the American South emerges as a general pattern across pastoral 
environments. Which model of cultural evolution best explains this pattern? A memetic model 
can be ruled out on the grounds that it predicts random covariation among psychological 
phenotypes and socioecological contexts. Indeed, the tendency for the reactive psychological 
phenotype to be most prevalent across geographically isolated pastoral communities, but 
comparatively absent from horticultural contexts, suggests that it originates and is maintained by 
selection on biological individuals. 
     The observed pattern of covariation among psychological phenotypes and socioecological 
contexts is consistent with an EP model. This model proposes that the relevant phenotypes are 
developmentally triggered by the socioecological conditions in which they are biologically 
advantageous. As it was argued earlier, a compelling test of this hypothesis would involve a 
comparison of populations in which pastoral and horticultural practices have been recently 
adopted. Unfortunately this type of information was unavailable in the HRAF. However, other 
considerations suggest against the plausibility of EP. First, Nisbett and Cohen describe a number 
of different social norms and parental practices that distinguish Northerners from Southerners. 
The current pilot study likewise found that norms condemning violence are most common in 
horticultural contexts. On an EP model these norms are thought to be expressions of an evoked 
culture, having no impact on psychological phenotype. This assumption conflicts with a 
considerable body of psychological literature describing how different cultural practices generate 
distinct psychological outcomes (discussed in Linquist 2007). Nor, as Sterelny has argued, is an 
EP model required to explain the fidelity of psychological phenotypes. The more evidence one 
finds for the cultural scaffolding of psychological phenotypes, the less compelling an EP model 
becomes. Finally, in the pilot study, comparisons of parental attitudes towards aggression did not 
support an EP model. Recall that EP views these as the expressions of an evoked culture. In 
which case, pro-aggression parental norms should be universal across pastoral contexts. On the 
contrary, one pastoral culture in the COH sample (the Saami) seemed to embrace anti-aggression 
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parenting norms. At the same time, pro aggression norms appeared in two industrial agricultural 
societies. Not only does this pattern conflict with the predictions of EP, it further suggests that 
parenting norms are socially transmitted rather than evoked. Hence, the fact that pro-aggression 
parenting norms were found in some pastoral cultures, but absent entirely from horticultural 
cultures where parental attitudes tended to be anti-aggression, suggests that they play a 
functional role in shaping psychological phenotypes. 
      Anthropological reports of Social Control describe social norms condemning violence. These 
were most prominent among Horticultural societies and uncommon among Pastoralists. This 
could be taken as evidence for DIT. However, it is noteworthy that a closer inspection of the 
specific content of thee norms revealed a diversity of strategies for dampening violence. Some 
horticulturalists develop myths about witchcraft. Others adopt systems of public ridicule. And so 
on. It was argued earlier that DI models tend to identify a relatively autonomous cultural factor 
that covaries with the focal phenotype. On the contrary, social mechanisms for condemning 
violence among horticultural communities take a diversity of forms. There was also suggestive 
evidence that these norms cluster with similar parental attitudes towards aggression. Together, 
these two types of ecological factor would appear to conjointly shape psychological phenotypes. 
It was also argued in “Theoretical commitments and competing predictions of alternative 
models” section that this pattern is best interpreted as a case of NCT. However, further 
investigation of the degree of clustering among cultural factors is an obvious avenue for future 
research. 
       Perhaps the most surprising result to come out of this study was that the Saami (a Pastoral 
cultural) seem to condemn aggression in children. Despite this, they exhibit high rates of Ingroup 
Antagonism and low levels of Social Control, as is typical of Pastoral societies. This observation 
is consistent with other anthropological reports of pastoral societies with high rates of 
aggression, while at the same time expressing certain attitudes against violence. Such examples 
suggest that pastoral societies contain a variety of compensatory norms and practices that work 
together in shaping the reactive psychological phenotypes. Modifications to particular elements 
of this otherwise cohesive system tend not to disrupt the associated phenotype. As it was argued 
earlier, this pattern conforms with the predictions of NCT. 
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Footnotes 
1
  Additional cultural factors that potentially influence the development of a reactive 
psychological phenotype might be found in the literature on the development of human 
aggression (e.g. Lemerise and Dodge 2008). 
 
2 
 The HRAF identifies nine subsistence categories altogether, three of which were selected for 
this study: Pastoralist cultures are defined as those which depend 56 % or more on herding and 
animal husbandry; Horticulturalists depend 56 % or more on simple agriculture; while Intensive 
Agriculturalists depend 56 % or more on large scale, irrigated agriculture. For current purposes, 
it was assumed that the pastoralists described in the HRAF approximate, more closely than the 
other two subsistence groups, the socio-ecological conditions identified by the culture of honour 
hypothesis, i.e. a herding-based economy autonomous from central authority. Intensive 
agricultural societies also served as a useful control for testing the evolutionary component, 
which predicts psychological divergence among pastoral and horticultural environments. 
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